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**IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY**

FRED KRAUS, an individual registered to vote
in Clark County, Nevada, DONALD J. TRUMP
FOR PRESIDENT, INC.; the NEVADA
REPUBLICAN PARTY,

Petitioners,

vs.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official
capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, JOSEPH
P. GLORIA, in his official capacity as Registrar
of Voters for Clark County, Nevada,

Respondents.

Case No. 20 OC 00142 1B
Dept No. 2

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF
PROHIBITION**

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**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION**

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondents Barbara Cegavske, as Secretary of State (“Secretary”), and Joseph P. Gloria, as Registrar for Clark County (“Registrar”), and intervenor respondents Democratic National Committee and Nevada State Democratic Party (collectively “Respondents”), understandably concede that the mail ballot tabulation now rapidly proceeding in Clark County is unprecedented. Under these extraordinary circumstances, it is essential that every public body—including this Court—take proper precautions to ensure this election is administered in a manner that protects Nevadans’ fundamental right to vote. It is not petitioners Fred Kraus, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., and the Nevada Republican Party (“Petitioners”), but rather the Registrar and Secretary’s current failings that are jeopardizing that right and undermining public confidence in the election. Unless this Court acts expeditiously to ensure ballots are not separated and counted improperly, Petitioners will have no opportunity to redress the serious legal wrongs currently occurring in Clark County’s mail vote tabulation process. The public must be able to trust this election is conducted honestly and transparently. Modest judicial action now to ensure this trust is an appropriate and necessary use of this Court’s equitable power.

II. STANDARD

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires.” *Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court*, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). Courts “may consider writ petitions when an important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial economy are served.” *Helfstein v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. 909, 912, 362 P.3d 91, 94 (2015).

III. ARGUMENT

A. PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO ADVANCE EACH CLAIM.

Although the Nevada Constitution does not contain a “case or controversy” clause, “Nevada has a long history of requiring an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial

1 relief.” *Doe v. Bryan*, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986). “A party must show a personal
2 injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public.” *Schwartz v.*
3 *Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016).

4 Petitioners satisfy each of these criteria. With this petition, Kraus, the campaign, and the
5 party seek to restore integrity to the Nevada election process. Petitioners cite three specific forms
6 of injury which more than suffice to establish standing: (1) compromise of process through
7 violation of public observation laws; (2) compromise of process through violation of ballot secrecy
8 laws; and (3) devaluation of the right to vote through a lack of uniform standards for signature
9 match and denial of a challenge procedure for mail-in ballots.

10 **1. Ensuring Meaningful Public Observation Is A Public Duty**
11 **Enforceable Through Mandamus.**

12 Under Nevada law, courts have authority to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in
13 response to applications of parties or persons who are “beneficially interested.” NRS 34.170,
14 34.330. Such beneficial interest vests individuals with standing to seek writ relief in Nevada’s
15 courts. *See Heller v. Legislature of Nev.*, 120 Nev. 456, 460-61, 93 P.3d 746, 749 (2004).
16 Individual petitioners may even pursue writs on behalf of the public in certain circumstances.
17 *Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 169 v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist.*, 130 Nev. 1207
18 (2014) (*unpub’d*). This principle allowed citizens to challenge the governor’s failure to comply
19 with a law requiring him to declare two judicial vacancies, *see State Bar of Nev. v. List*, 97 Nev.
20 367, 368, 632 P.2d 341, 342 (1981), and the Court’s 2008 decision allowing a political party to
21 seek a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the constitutionality of a statutory amendment
22 creating new judicial positions, *see Indep. Am. Party of Clark Cty. ex rel. Hansen v. Miller ex rel.*
23 *State*, 124 Nev. 1476 (2008) (*unpub’d*). Where a petitioner shows government actions or failures
24 to act directly damage the rights of the citizenry, courts allow the petition to proceed.
25

26 Petitioners have done that. They allege that the Secretary and Registrar have failed to
27 comply with their public duty to create a written plan to allow observation of the election process.
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1 Nevada law requires that the Registrar “*shall*, not later than April 15 of each year in which a
2 general election is held, submit to the Secretary of State for approval a written plan for the
3 accommodation of members of the general public who observe the delivery, counting, handling
4 and processing of ballots at a polling place, receiving center or central counting place.” NRS
5 293B.354 (emphasis added). “The word ‘shall’ is generally regarded as mandatory.” *Markowitz v.*
6 *Saxon Special Servicing*, 129 Nev. 660, 665, 310 P.3d 569, 572 (2013). Thus, petitioners have
7 alleged a public duty, not a discretionary function. “[W]hen a petition seeks to enforce a public
8 duty and involves a public right, the petitioner ‘is not required to show that he has any legal or
9 special interest in the result, it being sufficient if he shows that he is interested, as a citizen, in
10 having the laws executed and the right enforced.’ *Miller*, 124 Nev. 1476, 238 P.3d 821 (quoting
11 *State of Nevada v. Gracey*, 11 Nev. 223, 229–30 (1876)).

12
13 Moreover, Petitioners’ mandamus action is not mooted by the exhibits attached to the
14 Secretary’s brief. *First*, the heart of Petitioner’s claim is that the October 20, 2020 letter (sent only
15 after a demand was made by the Petitioners) that purports to include a “plan for observation of
16 ballots” does not actually comply with the Registrar’s public duty to ensure meaningful
17 observation. *Second*, the Secretary’s October 22, 2020 letter—suspiciously conveyed to the
18 Registrar after petitioners had sent a demand letter—expressly recognizes that there is a continuing
19 dereliction of the public duty to “ensure meaningful observation.” This is a live controversy.¹

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22 **2. Respondents Have A Public Duty To Ensure Ballot Secrecy.**

23 AB4, Sec. 16.(1)(c) requires that each active registered voter receive an “envelope or sleeve
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25 ¹ Even if this claim is otherwise moot, Petitioners can overcome mootness by proving “that (1) the duration
26 of the challenged action is relatively short, (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the
27 future, and (3) the matter is important.” *Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t*, 129 Nev. 328, 334–35,
28 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013). There is no question that the period in which voters can observe the processing
of ballots is short in duration, that similar issues will arise in future elections, and that the integrity and
sanctity of the fundamental right to vote is important.

1 into which the mail ballot is inserted to ensure its secrecy.” Although this claim was addressed
2 only by a mere paragraph of the combined hundreds of pages of briefing and exhibits in opposition
3 to Petitioners’ claim, Petitioners have a similar interest in ensuring both their ballots remain secret
4 and the public duty of ballot secrecy is fulfilled. *See Gracey*, 11 Nev. at 229–30.

5
6 **3. Petitioners Have Standing To Advance Their Equal Protection Claims.**

7 The Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote.
8 *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). This right “is protected in more than the initial
9 allocation of the franchise.” *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Once the state has “granted
10 the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
11 one person’s vote over that of another.” *Id.* Here, Petitioners allege a personal, concrete equal
12 protection injury in the devaluation of their fundamental right to vote through an admitted lack of
13 uniform standards.

14
15 These are cognizable harms. *See Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives*, 525
16 U.S. 316, 332 (1999) (recognizing vote dilution as an injury-in-fact for Article III standing). Kraus,
17 as an individual voter, will suffer a direct harm if his vote is diluted and if he is denied his statutory
18 right to meaningfully review the ballot counting process.² *See Clark Cty. v. City of Las Vegas*, 92
19 Nev. 323, 342, 550 P.2d 779, 792 (1976) (“[A] voter has the constitutional right to have his vote
20 given as much weight as any other vote and not to have his vote denied, debased, or diluted in any
21 manner.”). Likewise, the campaign and party will suffer harms where government action burdens
22 the availability of political opportunity. *See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 199
23 (1986). Petitioners’ application for writ relief thus falls squarely within the category for which
24 courts recognize standing to pursue relief. Indeed, the ends of this petition are the very ends for
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28 ² *See* Declaration of Fred Kraus (“Kraus Dec.”) at ¶¶ 5–25.

1 which writ relief exists: to compel government actors to perform their statutory duties and to
2 prohibit them from taking unlawful or ultra vires action subjecting petitioners to injury. NRS
3 34.170, 34.330.

4 Despite the Secretary’s misguided citation of the late Justice Scalia’s private feelings, *Bush*
5 *v. Gore* remains good law that has consistently been applied by courts across the country for two
6 decades to establish the standing of plaintiffs and remedy equal protection injuries nearly identical
7 to those here. *See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell*, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The increased
8 probability that their votes will be improperly counted based on punch-card and central-count
9 optical scan technology is neither speculative nor remote.”), *vacated* (July 21, 2006), *superseded*,
10 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (vacated and superseded on the grounds that the case was rendered
11 moot by the county’s subsequent abandonment of the DRE machines at issue); *Banfield v. Cortes*,
12 922 A.2d 36, 44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
13 standing under similar Pennsylvania law, based on “the fact that Electors have no way of knowing
14 whether the votes they cast on a DRE have been recorded and will be counted,” which “gives
15 Electors a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of this litigation”). Indeed, Justice
16 Kavanaugh cited *Bush v. Gore* just yesterday. *See Democratic National Committee, et al. v.*
17 *Wisconsin State Legislature, et al.*, No. 20A66, 592 U.S. ___, slip op. 9 n.1 (Oct. 26, 2020)
18 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (citing *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S.
19 at 120 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring)). The Secretary might disagree with the Supreme Court, but
20 this Court should faithfully apply binding precedent.
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24 Consistent with this body of equal protection case law, Petitioners allege an actual injury:
25 Mail-in voters must undergo human signature match safeguards everywhere in Nevada except in
26 Clark County, where many thousands of mail-in voters’ signatures go unreviewed by any human
27 being. This “continued reliance on the use of [the Agilis] machines in public elections likely results
28

1 in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of [Petitioners’] vote[s],’ even if such conduct does not
2 completely deny [Petitioners] the right to vote.” *Curling v. Kemp*, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1322
3 (N.D. Ga. 2018), *aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Curling v. Sec’y of Georgia*, 761
4 F. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. at 105). Petitioners allege that
5 because of this machine, “voters in some counties are statistically less likely to have their votes
6 counted than voters in other counties in the same state in the same election for the same office”
7 because of this lack of uniform standards, such that “[s]imilarly situated persons are treated
8 differently in an arbitrary manner.” *Black v. McGuffage*, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
9 “By employing different standards within [] different counties,” the Secretary and Registrar have
10 “ratified a system of ‘uneven treatment’ that result[s] in the debasement of votes statewide.” *Pierce*
11 *v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Elections*, 324 F. Supp. 2d 684, 697 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (citing *Bush*, 531
12 U.S. at 107). The deprivation of Petitioner’s right to have their ballots treated under uniform
13 standards by election officials in the state is an injury that is redressable by a court order mandating
14 uniformity. *See Elley v. Stephens*, 104 Nev. 413, 416-17, 760 P.2d 768, 770 (1988).

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16
17 Petitioners likewise have standing to bring their claim that the disparate vote challenge
18 process violates equal protection principles. *See NRS 293.303*. This admitted dis-uniformity is a
19 particularized equal protection injury against Petitioner Kraus, who has voted in-person but faced
20 a different standard from every vote-by-mail voter and continues have his vote diluted or cancelled
21 by unchallengeable votes.³ “[I]f this court does not act, there will be no mechanism by which
22 absentee ballots could be challenged for alleged violations of the election code and the United
23

24
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26 ³ Kraus Dec., at ¶ 4. Intervenor’s mistake Petitioners’ the alleged injury for a desire to someday challenge a
27 mail-in ballot in the future. Intervenor’s Br. at 11. That is incorrect. Rather, Kraus is injured because he has
28 already voted in person under a system that allows for challenges, but hundreds of thousands of
unchallengeable mail-in ballots have been cast or are certainly impending, debasing the weight of his in-
person vote. *See Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. at 105.

1 States Constitution” on the same terms as in-person ballots. 324 F. Supp. 2d at 692.⁴

2 **B. MANDAMUS IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT MEANINGFUL**
3 **OBSERVATION**

4 The primary issue in this Emergency Petition is whether the observation scheme created
5 by the Registrar complies with the law. The answer is a resounding no. The Registrar has
6 developed a program wherein officials can hide in plain sight, not allowing observers any
7 meaningful right to serve as sunlight for Nevada election integrity.

8 Providing petitioners with an opportunity to meaningfully observe is not discretionary
9 under the statute—it is mandatory. “When interpreting a statute, this court begins with the statute’s
10 text.” *Andrews v. State*, 134 Nev. 95, 97, 412 P.3d 37, 38 (2018). The Court will use “legitimate
11 tools of statutory interpretation, including related statutes.” *Castaneda v. State*, 132 Nev. 434, 439,
12 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016). When the plain and ordinary text of a statute is unambiguous, Nevada
13 Courts need not look beyond the text. *City of North Las Vegas v. Warburton*, 127 Nev. 682 (Oct.
14 6, 2011).

15
16 The text of the statute clearly requires Nevada Counties to accommodate members of the
17 public who desire to “observe” the delivery, counting, handling and processing of ballots at a
18 polling place, receiving center or central counting place. And counties must allow the public to
19 actually “observe the activities.” NRS 293B.354(2). The plain meaning of the terms confirms this.
20 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines the term “observe” in relevant part as “to watch
21 carefully especially with attention to details or behavior for the purpose of arriving at a
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23
24 ⁴ Nevada courts recognize a “public-importance” exception to the injury requirement of standing. *See*
25 *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743. Although the courts traditionally apply this exception only in taxpayer suits
26 challenging legislative expenditures or allocations, the principles underlying the exception undoubtedly
27 apply in suits like the present one in which matters of general public consequence are involved. If this Court
28 is unpersuaded by the specific injuries alleged by petitioners, petitioners alternatively argue that they have
standing under this exception to the general injury requirement.

1 judgment.”⁵ This definition is consistent with the commonly understood meaning and usage of
2 the term. *See, e.g.*, OBSERVE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To watch carefully.”).
3 By definition, “observation” thus necessarily requires public on-lookers to be
4 afforded *meaningful* review. They must be permitted to “watch carefully” and “with attention to
5 details.”

6
7 Contrary to Respondents’ argument, the content of this right to public observation in NRS
8 293B.353 is not limited to “the counting of the ballots” because the next provision of the statute
9 provides specifics that inform the broader public right: “[t]he county clerk *shall*” create a plan for
10 “the accommodation of members of the general public who observe the *delivery, counting,*
11 *handling and processing* of ballots at a *polling place, receiving center or central counting place.*”
12 NRS 293B.354 (emphasis added). “Specific provisions take precedence over general provisions.”
13 *Davidson v. Davidson*, 132 Nev. 709, 714, 382 P.3d 880, 883 (2016). The right to public
14 observation must include, at a minimum, each of the emphasized elements of the election process
15 in NRS 293B.354: ballot delivery, ballot counting, ballot handling, and ballot processing shall be
16 accommodated by the clerk’s written plan; each of these actions must be observable at the polling
17 place, ballot receiving center, and central counting place by the general public.

18
19 The purpose of the public observation requirement confirms this reading: to ensure that
20 ballots are delivered, counted, handled, and processed properly. *See* NRS 293B.354(2); *see*
21 *also Opinion of the Justices*, 371 A.2d 616, 622–23 (Me. 1977) (“The stated purpose of [the
22 statute] is clear: –the counting [of ballots] must be done in such a way as to
23 facilitate public observation. We infer from this stated purpose the ultimate but unarticulated
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27 ⁵*Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/observe> (emphasis added). This definition is also consistent with the Election Observation Handbook (6th
28 Ed.), published by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. *See* Pet. at 5.

1 goal:—the public observation must be such as to ensure to those present that the ballots are being
2 counted correctly."); *Davidson*, 132 Nev. at 713, 382 P.3d at 883 (“This court’s goal in construing
3 statutes is to uphold the intent of the Legislature”). Indeed, the statute establishes a presumption
4 of public access with a narrow exception to avoid public interference: “if [the] members do not
5 interfere with the counting of the ballots,” then the “city clerk shall allow [those] members of the
6 general public to observe the counting of the ballots at the central counting place.” NRS
7 293B.353(1).⁶

8
9 Despite this clear statutory right, the Secretary continues to refuse to comply with her
10 duties. As Exhibit B to the Secretary’s Response brief shows, the Secretary noticed a problem with
11 public observation and requested an improvement, but to no avail. The Registrar has still not
12 afforded such meaningful public observation of the election activities and the Secretary has not
13 ensured it. As the Petition describes, observers are often located more than 25 feet from certain
14 processes and cannot observe computer screens or monitors of election workers or observe calls
15 made regarding cure processes. *See Pet.* at 5. Further, public observers are restricted from certain
16 areas where ballots are handled or reviewed, as well as rooms dedicated to resolving ballot issues.
17 All these processes are necessary to the “counting, handling and processing of ballots” and thus
18 must be open to meaningful observation. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Registrar and Secretary
19 are violating the election laws designed to ensure public integrity and transparency in Nevada’s
20 election process.
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24 ⁶ The Secretary of State’s position that the Election Code chapter heading somehow limits the public’s right
25 to observation of vote-by-mail ballots is incorrect because “Mechanical voting systems” is a defined term.
26 Indeed, the statute defines “Mechanical voting system” in the broadest possible sense: “a system of voting
27 whereby a voter may cast a vote.” NRS 293B.033. Because vote-by-mail processes are “a system of voting
28 whereby a voter may cast a vote,” the public’s right to meaningful observation applies with equal force to
mail-in ballots processing.

1 This lack of observation is an irreparable harm. Every day, thousands of ballots are being
2 separated from their only form of identification—at which point there is no way to challenge those
3 votes and ensure they are lawfully cast. The evidence is thus spoliated and the dilution of the
4 voters’ rights that might have been prevent through transparency cannot be repaired. *See Fla.*
5 *Democratic Party v. Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (stating with respect to
6 elections: “This isn’t golf; there are no mulligans.”).

8 **C. PROHIBITION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE BALLOT SECRECY.**

9 This issue was ignored completely by Respondents and mentioned only in passing by the
10 intervenors as “mere speculation.” Intervenors Br. at 10. Ballot secrecy is critical. *See Minnesota*
11 *Voters All. v. Mansky*, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1883 (2018). Petitioners explained that what little
12 observation has been afforded them shows that the Registrar is not protecting ballot secrecy, Pet.
13 at 6, violating a clear duty in AB 4, § 27 (“The clerk shall develop a procedure to ensure that each
14 mail ballot is kept secret”).

16 **D. MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION IS NECESSARY TO RESTORE
17 EQUAL PROTECTION.**

18 Contrary to Respondents’ bald assertion, Petitioners do not argue that vote-by-mail and in-
19 person voters must be treated identically. Indeed, Petitioners agree with the Registrar’s analogy:
20 “the signature verification process for a mail ballot voter is the equivalent of a prospective voter
21 checking in at a polling place.” Registrar’s Br. at 4. But as a result of Respondents’ twin Equal
22 Protection Clause violations, mail-in voters have an advantage over Petitioner Kraus and similarly
23 situated voters who have voted in person but continue to have their votes devalued by lack of
24 uniform statewide standards for ballot security. Two election processes violate the Equal
25 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

26 *First*, Nevada deprives voters of equal protection by providing a mechanism for
27 challenging voters who vote in person at polling locations but not for voters who vote by mail. *See*
28

1 NRS 293.303.⁷ In *Charfauros v. Board of Elections*, the court considered “whether the Equal
2 Protection Clause permits a State to discriminate among its citizens based on who challenged their
3 voter eligibility,” or “whether the voter challenge procedures adopted by the Board ‘are consistent
4 with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate.’”
5 249 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2001), *as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc* (July 6, 2001)
6 (quoting *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98) (cleaned up). In that case, “the Board created two classes of
7 challenged voters—Republican voters, whose eligibility was challenged by the Democratic Party
8 and considered before the election, and Democratic voters, whose eligibility was challenged by
9 the Republican Party and considered after the election.” *Id.* at 945. The Court concluded this
10 classification was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause—and so clearly unlawful
11 that the election officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. (“A reasonable Board would
12 have known its actions violated the fundamental rights to vote and to equal treatment under the
13 law ... the Board is not entitled to qualified immunity”). *Id.* at 955–56.

14 **Second**, the Registrar is using a defective signature matching computer system. Vote-by-
15 mail voters in Clark County thus have an advantage over voters anywhere else in the state, whether
16 compared to using either mail or in-person balloting. This is because many thousands of vote-by-
17 mail ballots are never reviewed by a human being, as the Registrar stunningly admits. *See*
18 Registrar’s Br. at 7 (“the machine’s match rate to the County’s election database has hovered
19 around 30%); *see also* Decl. of Joseph P. Gloria (“If the Agilis machine does not match the
20 signature, it is *then* reviewed by Election Department staff”) (emphasis added). *See Pierce*, 324 F.
21 Supp. 2d at 699 (“Voters ... who take advantage of defendant’s policy ... may be afforded greater
22 voting strength than similarly-situated voters”). This process not only subjects voters to unequal
23 treatment, it also violates the express requirements of AB 4. Section 23 of AB 4 specifically states
24 that, with respect to each mail ballot received, “the clerk or an employee in the office of the clerk
25 shall check the signature used for the mail ballot.” Although Section 22 generally permits “mail

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27 ⁷ NRS 293.547 is not a procedure for challenging mail in ballots, contrary to Respondent’s
28 representation to the court. *See* Hearing Tr. 15:2-9 (Miller).

1 ballots to be processed and counted by electronic means,” any such electronic processing may not
2 “conflict with the provisions of sections 2 to 27, inclusive, of this act.” Nothing in AB 4 permits
3 use of a machine to check mail ballot signatures in lieu of the statutory requirement that this
4 critically important task be conducted by “the clerk or an employee in the office of the clerk.”
5 Indeed, the Legislature’s specific use of the words “or an employee in the office of the clerk”
6 reinforces its statutory mandate that all signature verification must be conducted by a human
7 being.⁸

8 Under the Equal Protection Clause, “[d]ilution of the right to vote may not be accomplished
9 by stuffing the ballot-boxes,” “[n]or may the right to vote be diluted by” state officials’ “improper
10 counting of ballots.” *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). Thus, Petitioners are
11 suffering irreparable equal protection harm due to the unlawful use of the Agilis machine. *See*
12 *Feldman v. Arizona Sec’y of State’s Office*, 843 F.3d 366, 394 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]here are no
13 ‘do over’ elections; ‘the State cannot run the election over again[.]’ ” (citation omitted)); *Obama*
14 *for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A restriction on the fundamental right to
15 vote . . . constitutes irreparable injury.”); *Martin v. Crittenden*, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1310 (N.D.
16 Ga. 2018) (“[N]one of the harm that [Respondents] will allegedly suffer from an injunction rises
17 to the same level as the harm that disenfranchised [voters] (and, undoubtedly, other absentee
18 voters) will suffer without an order from this Court. . . . [I]t is axiomatic that there is no post hoc
19 remedy for a violation of the right to vote.”).

20 Finally, laches does not bar relief in this case. “In determining whether the doctrine of
21 laches should preclude consideration of a petition for mandamus, it must be demonstrated that (1)
22 there was inexcusable delay in seeking the petition, (2) an implied waiver arose from petitioner’s
23 knowing acquiescence in existing conditions, and (3) prejudice resulted to the respondent.” *We*

24
25 ⁸ Election officials lack authority to undertake any action contrary to governing statute or regulation. *Kelly*
26 *v. Murphy*, 79 Nev. 1 (1963). Any such unauthorized conduct is a “futile act,” a term of art that means it is
27 thus void as a matter of law. *Id.* at 4. Thus, as AB 4 expressly requires that mail ballot signatures be
28 checked by “the clerk or an employee of the clerk,” Registrar’s use of the Agilis Ballot Packing Sorting
System (“Agilis System”) to check mail ballot signatures has been futile.

1 *The People Nevada ex rel. Angle v. Miller ex rel. State*, 124 Nev. 1518, 238 P.3d 865 n.20 (2008)
2 (*unpub'd*). Respondents have made no such showing, nor could they. Petitioners acted promptly
3 upon learning of the disparity between Clark County's signature matching process and the
4 signature matching process elsewhere in the state. Moreover, the only prejudice in this case is not
5 to Respondents, but to voters who are not subject to the faulty Agilis machine who have their votes
6 diluted or cancelled by improperly counted ballots.

7 **IV. CONCLUSION**

8 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court issue a writ of
9 mandate or, alternatively, prohibition requiring the Secretary and Registrar to immediately:

10 1. Cease and desist from further use of the Agilis System to check the signature for any
11 mail ballot, and for the Registrar to conduct all further mail ballot signature verification
12 individually or through his employees as required by AB 4;

13 2. Permit meaningful public observation of the mail ballot signature verification process
14 without violating the privacy right of any Nevada voter;


15 3. Permit election observers to challenge the signature on any mail ballot before it is
16 tabulated;

17 4. Maintain ballot secrecy as required by AB 4; and

18 5. Maintain physical connection between each challenged signature and its associated
19 ballot until such time as this challenge has been finally resolved or adjudicated.

20 Dated this 27th day of October, 2020.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

21
22 By 
23 Brian R. Hardy, Esq.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR CARSON CITY

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, does not contain the Social Security number of any person.

Dated this 27th day of October, 2020.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

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
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION was submitted for filing and/or service with the First Judicial District Court on the 27th day of October, 2020. Service of the foregoing document was made by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, postage prepaid, addressed to:


an employee of Marquis Aurbach Coffing

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