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	10	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	11	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
	12	CKE
	13	Arizona Alliance for Retired Americans; et al.,  No. 2:22-CV-01374-GMS
	14	Plaintiffs, OBJECTION TO SECRETARY OF
	15	v. STATE KATIE HOBBS'S NOTICE RE INTERPRETATION OF SB 1260
Dane Arizona Center, Phoenix, 66	16	Katie Hobbs, in her official capacity as
One Aı	17	Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, et al.,
	18	Defendants.
	19 20	
	21	In response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Secretary of State Katic
	22	Hobbs filed a "Notice" regarding her interpretation of Senate Bill ("SB") 1260. [Doc. 73.]
	23	Proposed-Intervenor Yuma County Republican Party ("YCRC") takes no issue with the
	24	Secretary's factual statements regarding her office's current practices and procedures
	25	related to cancellation of voter registrations and removal of voters from the Arizona Early
	26	Voter List ("AEVL"). However, YCRC strongly objects to the Secretary's politically
	27	charged and argumentative interpretation of those same provisions. Importantly, at the

Court's September 14, 2022, return hearing, the Secretary of State asked to be declared a

nominal party. The Secretary's interpretation of SB 1260 goes well beyond explaining current procedures. Because the Secretary is a nominal party, the Court should disregard this "interpretation." But, even if the Court considers the Secretary's interpretation, it should be rejected for the following reasons.

## I. The Plain Meaning of SB 1260 Does Not Support the Secretary's Interpretation of the Cancellation and Removal Provisions.

The Secretary suggests that the only reasonable reading of the Cancellation and Removal Provisions' "credible information" phrase is to read into the law a source requirement not present in the actual text of SB 1260. Specifically, the Secretary urges that this Court adopt a construction of SB 1260 that requires "credible information" to come only from another county recorder or some other government election official. [Doc. 73 at 6-7.] This argument belies the plain meaning of the statutes at issue.

A federal court's "role when interpreting a state statue as a matter of first impression is to 'determine what meaning the state's highest court would give to the law." *Brunozzi v. Cable Comm'ns, Inc.*, 851 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Bass v. County of Butte*, 458 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2006)). In Arizona, the Supreme Court will "read words in context and effectuate the plain meaning of [the statute] unless doing so would be absurd." *S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Rev.*, 253 Ariz. 30, ¶ 14 (2022). However, a court "will not read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself." *Collins v. Stockwell*, 137 Ariz. 416, 420 (1983).

Here, A.R.S. § 16-165(B) and § 16-544(R) use parallel language: "If the county recorder receives credible information that a person has registered to vote in a different county, the county recorder shall confirm the person's voter registration with that other county." And "[w]hen the county recorder receives confirmation *from another county recorder* that the person registered has registered to vote in that other county," then the first county recorder is directed to either cancel the voter's old registration or remove the voter from their outdated AEVL. A.R.S. §§ 16-165(A)(10) (emphasis added), 16-544(Q) (requiring receipt of "confirmation *from another county*" (emphasis added)).

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Stated another way, when the county recorder receives credible information about a voter's new registration, then the recorder must seek confirmation from the appropriate county recorder or county. It is significant that the Legislature included a source requirement for the confirmation portion of the statute but not the credible information portion of the statute. Reading in the phrase "from the county recorder" (or other election official) in relation to the receipt of credible information would render the words "from the county recorder" in the confirmation portion to be meaningless. Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 443 ¶ 20 (2018) ("We will not interpret statutes or rules in a manner that renders portions of their text superfluous."). It would also create an absurd, circular requirement: Why would the legislature require a county recorder to confirm the "credible" information" with the very county from whom he received the information? This construction should be rejected. State ex rel Montgomery v. Harris, 237 Ariz. 98, 102 ¶ 13 (2014) ("Statutes should be construed sensibly to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion.").

Put simply, if the "legislature had intended to include" a source requirement for credible information in SB 1260's Cancellation and Removal Provisions, "it would have expressly done so." Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 323, 327 ¶ 15 (2011).

The phrase "credible information" is more appropriately interpreted by simply looking at the plain meaning of the words used. "Credible" means something that "offer[s] reasonable grounds for being believed." Credible, Merriam-Webster. With this lens, the statute requires the county recorder who receives information regarding a voter's purported registration in a different county to review that information and determine whether the source provides reasonable grounds for being believed. If the county recorder reasonably determines that the information is in fact credible, only then is the county recorder required to confirm the information with the appropriate recorder in the voter's new county of residence.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/credible

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Under this standard, bare allegations would not be sufficient to trigger an investigation, because they would not provide reasonable grounds for being believed. For instance, if a "third-party organization" were to deliver a list of names to a county recorder under the suspicion that those individuals had re-registered, without any information about the grounds for believing the individuals on such list had re-registered, that would not be enough information to constitute "credible information." Not only would this pose logistical problems for the county recorder (e.g., a list with only names could prove impossible to distinguish between voters with the same name), there must be adequate information presented to constitute a reasonable basis for believing a person has re-registered to vote in a different county.

For all these reasons, this Court should reject the Secretary's interpretation.

## II. The Court Should Not Endorse the Secretary's Suggestion to Willfully Ignore Arizonans.

The Secretary's interpretation of "credible information" all but dictates that the county recorders should blindly ignore information reported to their offices by their own constituents. [Doc. 73 at 7.) This interpretation invites willful disregard of citizen grievances in violation of the county recorders' statutory duties.

County recorders are charged with certifying the "completeness and correctness" of their precinct registers before transmitting them to the election boards. See A.R.S. § 16-169(A). As a local political party, YCRC relies on these registers. If the county recorders were to ignore credible information regarding a voter's re-registration in another county from any source other than another county recorder (or other election official), they would be knowingly and willfully disregarding this duty to certify that the voter lists are accurate.

Moreover, the responsibility of a public office to review citizen requests like those that may stem from the "credible information" provision is not as radical as the Secretary suggests.<sup>2</sup> Like other reasonable laws designed to provide citizens with an opportunity to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Secretary's footnote regarding action taken by "non-governmental third party organizations" in Georgia is entirely inappropriate given her nominal status. She suggests

Given that the Secretary admits that she does not have any supervisory capacity over the county recorders offices or their administration of their official duties, these arguments should be left to the counties. [See Doc. 73 at 9-10.]

## II. Statutory Interpretation Is Not Within the Secretary's Purview.

The Secretary offers her interpretation SB 1260 on behalf of the State as a purportedly neutral party. But she is not. Moreover, statutory interpretation falls under the purview of the courts—not an elected member of the executive branch. *Leibsohn v. Hobbs*, No. CV-22-0204-AP/EL, 2022 WL 4352090, at ¶ 22 (Ariz. Sept. 20, 2022) (rejecting the Secretary's interpretation of a statute in the election procedures manual that "contradict[ed] statutory requirements" and emphasizing that it is the "Court's role, not the Secretary's, to interpret [the] meaning" of election laws). If the Secretary is concerned with the interpretation of SB 1260 and its impact on the Court's adjudication of the issues in this case, this case would be an appropriate candidate for a certified question to the Arizona Supreme Court for an interpretation of SB 1260. *See* A.R.S. § 12-1861 ("The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a United States district court" when "it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the intermediate appellate courts of this state."); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 27.

Certification is "[d]esigned to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues." *Arizonans for Off. English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997). Certification of dispositive underlying issues of state law directly

that the request coming from an apparently Republican source is (a) not credible information and (b) might someday happen in Arizona. [Doc. 73 at 7 n.5.] However, no county in this litigation has suggested that these sorts of actions are occurring in their counties or speculate regarding whether they might ever occur in the future.

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to the State Supreme Court also "reduc[es] the delay, cut[s] the cost, and increas[es] the assurance of gaining an authoritative response." Id. Here, assuming that Plaintiffs can somehow get past the justiciability problems with many of their claims, there are four issues of statutory interpretation that are antecedent issues to Plaintiffs' constitutional and other federal question challenges:

- 1. What is the plain meaning of "credible information" as used in A.R.S. § 16-165(B) and A.R.S. § 16-544(R)?
- 2. Does "credible information," as referenced in A.R.S. § 16-165(B) and A.R.S. § 16-544(R), need to come from a certain source (i.e., a county recorder or other election official), or may it come from any source?
- Does "knowingly," as used in A.R.S. § 16-1016(12), modify one or both 3. requirements that follow it?
- What is the plain meaning of "mechanisms for voting," as used in A.R.S. 4. § 16-1016(12)?

The Court's interpretation of Sections 16-164 and 16-544 will impact its evaluation of Plaintiffs' claimed (and speculative) injury of disenfranchisement, which is in turn relevant to Plaintiffs' due process claims as well as YCRC's justiciability defense. Similarly, the Court's interpretation of Section 16-1016(12) is integral to Plaintiffs' due process, vagueness, and overbreadth claims.

As such, certification is appropriate here because there now there are several issues of state statutory construction that are dispositive to the Court's adjudication of the constitutional and federal issues before it, and because as a brand-new statute it is naturally one of first impression. Accordingly, it would be appropriate and prudent for this Court to certify these four questions to the Arizona Supreme Court.

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that, on September 20, 2022, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing, which automatically sends a Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel of record.

s/ Tracy Hobbs

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