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	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
14	UNITED STATES DIS	STRICT COURT		
	UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF			
15	DISTRICT OF	ARIZONA		
15 16	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit			
15 16 17	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona	ARIZONA		
15 16 17 18	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a	ARIZONA		
15 16 17 18	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Kris Mayes, in	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Kris Mayes, in her official capacity as Arizona Attorney	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Kris Mayes, in her official capacity as Arizona Attorney General; Katie Hobbs, in her official	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	American Encore, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Karen Glennon, an Arizona individual; America First Policy Institute, a non-profit corporation,  Plaintiffs,  v.  Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State; Kris Mayes, in her official capacity as Arizona Attorney	ARIZONA No. CV-24-01673-PHX-MTL		

For their Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 1), Defendants Adrian Fontes, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, and Kristin K. Mayes, in her official capacity as Arizona Attorney General, admit, deny, and allege as follows<sup>1</sup>:

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

Paragraph 1 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response

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# is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants affirmatively allege that the EPM contains instructions and guidance in

addition to rules. Defendants further allege that, as Arizona courts have recognized, not every provision of the EPM is a rule and not every provision of the EPM has the force of

law. Defendants further allege that EPM is addressed to county, city, and town election

officials, not members of the public.

2. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that Chapter 13, section II(B)(2) of the EPM (the "Canvass Provision") describes the Secretary's non-discretionary duty

to conduct the statewide canvass by a date certain, which arises from statute. See A.R.S.

§ 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges that the Legislature has modified canvassing deadlines since the 2023 EPM took effect. The Secretary further alleges that

under current law, the Secretary has a non-discretionary duty to conduct the statewide

canvass by the third Monday following the general election. A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b).

The Secretary further alleges that he is prohibited by law from extending the deadline for

the statewide canvass (or any other election-related deadline set by statute). A.R.S. § 16-

407.03. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the 2023 EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every

county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a

mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to

perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or, (2) if necessary, asking

a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those

<sup>1</sup> The Court dismissed the Attorney General as a defendant as to Count I. Doc. 62.

- certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 3. Paragraph 3 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants affirmatively allege that Chapter 9, section III(D) of the EPM (hereafter "section III(D)") contains a mixture of guidance, instructions, and rules applicable to elections officials. Defendants further allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiffs, voters, or members of the general public.
- 4. Paragraph 4 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) is a rule that governs Plaintiffs, voters, or members of the general public.
- 5. Paragraph 5 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.

#### LEGAL BACKGROUND

- 6. Defendants admit that the Secretary is required by A.R.S. § 16-452(A) to prescribe certain rules. Defendants affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' description of A.R.S. § 16-452(A) is incomplete. Defendants also allege that § 16-452(A) is not the only source of the Secretary's authority for the EPM. Defendants also allege that the EPM contains guidance and instructions for election officials, not just rules.
- 7. Defendants admit that the Secretary is required by A.R.S. § 16-452(A) to prescribe certain rules and that rules promulgated pursuant to that authority are included in the Election Procedures Manual. Defendants affirmatively allege that in addition to

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rules promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-452, the EPM also contains guidance and instructions for election officials.

- 8. Defendants deny the first sentence of paragraph 8. Defendants admit the second sentence of paragraph 8, but clarify that A.R.S. § 16-452(C) means something quite different from the first sentence of paragraph 8. Defendants affirmatively allege that Arizona courts have recognized that the EPM contains instructions and guidance for election officials in addition to rules applicable to election officials. See McKenna v. Soto, 481 P.3d 695, 699 (2021). Defendants further allege that the criminal penalty outlined in A.R.S. § 16-452 applies only to rules promulgated pursuant to § 16-452 and that a person can only violate a rule if it regulates him or her.
- Defendants deny that the EPM restricts any speech. 9. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section IIID) regulates Plaintiffs, voters, or any member of the public. Defendants otherwise lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 9 and therefore deny them.
  - 10. Deny.

#### THE PARTIES

- Admit on information and belief that American Encore is a 501(c)(4) 11. nonprofit organization that is based in Arizona. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 11 and therefore deny them.
- 12. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 12 and therefore deny them.
- 13. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 13 and therefore deny them.
- 14. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 14 and therefore deny them.
- 15. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 15 and therefore deny them.

- Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiff American
  Encore and that any costs incurred by Plaintiff American Encore are voluntary and not
  traceable to the 2023 EPM.
  - 16. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 16 and therefore deny them. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiff American Encore and that any costs incurred by Plaintiff American Encore are voluntary and not traceable to the 2023 EPM.
  - 17. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 17 and therefore deny them. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiff American Encore and that any trainings conducted or costs incurred by Plaintiff American Encore are voluntary and not traceable to the 2023 EPM.
  - 18. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 18 and therefore deny them.
  - 19. Admit on information and belief that Plaintiff Karen Glennon is an individual domiciled in Apache County, Arizona. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 and therefore deny them.
    - 20. Deny.
    - 21. Deny.
  - 22. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiff Glennon or any member of the public.
  - 23. Admit on information and belief that Plaintiff AFPI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 23 and therefore deny them.

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- 24. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations in paragraph 24 and therefore deny them. Defendants affirmatively allege that AFPI does not and cannot conduct "credentialing."
- 25. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations in paragraph 25 and therefore deny them.
- 26. Defendants affirmatively allege that no part of section III(D) regulates Plaintiff AFPI or its members and that any trainings conducted or costs incurred by Plaintiff AFPI are voluntary and not traceable to the 2023 EPM.
- 27. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations in paragraph 27 and therefore deny them.
- Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 28. as to the allegations in paragraph 28 and therefore deny them. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiff AFPI or its members and that any changes to AFPI's operations or communications are voluntary and not traceable to the 2023 EPM.
- Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 29. as to the allegations in paragraph 29 and therefore deny them. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiff AFPI or its members and that no member of AFPI faces a "risk of enforcement."
- 30. Paragraph 30 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.
  - 31. Admit.
- Admit that the Secretary is the chief state election officer and is responsible 32. for issuing the EPM, but deny that every EPM provision has "the force of law." Defendants affirmatively allege that the EPM contains guidance and information for election officials in addition to rules applicable to election officials.
- 33. Admit, except that the Attorney General's enforcement authority as stated in A.R.S. § 16-1021 is more specific than Plaintiffs summarize in paragraph 33.

34. The Court dismissed Governor Hobbs as a defendant on July 29, 2024, Doc. 1 2 25, so the allegations in paragraph 34 do not require a response. **JURISDICTION AND VENUE** 3 35. Defendants admit that Plaintiffs purport to assert claims arising under 4 5 federal law, but Defendants deny that this is a case or controversy as required for this 6 Court's Article III jurisdiction. 36. Admit. 7 **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS** 8 37. Admit. 9 38. Admit. 10 39. Admit. 11 Admit that paragraph 40 accurately quotes the cited case, but deny that the 40. 12 case suggests that the EPM applies to members of the public. In the Fontes case, the 13 defendant was an election official (a county recorder), not a member of the public. 14 15 Defendants affirmatively allege that the EPM also contains guidance and instructions in addition to rules directed to election officials and that only rules have the force of law. 16 41. 17 Defendants admit that the officer in charge of elections is responsible for tabulating votes pursuant to the cited statutes. Defendants deny that the county recorder 18 is usually the officer in charge of elections in this context. Defendants allege that with 19 20 respect to tabulating ballots and receiving election returns, county boards of supervisors are the officers in charge of elections, unless they have designated that authority to 21 22 another person. 42. Admit. 23 43. Admit. Defendants affirmatively allege that the Secretary does not canvass 24 all races and ballot measures that county boards of supervisors canvass. The Secretary is 25 responsible for canvassing only federal, statewide, and legislative offices, appellate 26 27 judges, and statewide ballot measures.

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### THE 2022 COCHISE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS' ELECTION CERTIFICATION DELAY

- 44. Admit that events surrounding the 2022 election impacted some of the provisions in the 2023 EPM.
- 45. The Secretary admits that in 2022, the Cochise County Board of Supervisors for a time refused to canvass Cochise County's election results and that the Cochise County Board of Supervisors failed to canvass Cochise County's election results by the statutory deadline (which, at the time, was November 28, 2022), but denies that the Cochise County Board of Supervisors' failure to canvass by the statutory deadline did, in fact, ultimately delay the statewide canvass. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the Cochise County Board of Supervisors certified Cochise County's election results on December 1, 2022, after being ordered to do so by a court—two days after Cochise County's statutory deadline to certify (November 28, 2022). The Secretary further alleges that following Cochise County's delayed certification, then-Secretary Hobbs conducted the statewide canvass as scheduled on December 5, 2022—consistent with the Secretary's statutory deadline to canvass (which, at the time, was December 5, 2022, and could have been postponed by three days). The Secretary further alleges that the Legislature modified the deadlines for canvassing election results in early 2024. See H.B. 2785, 56th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2024). The Secretary further alleges that under current law, the Secretary has a non-discretionary duty to conduct the statewide canvass by the third Monday following the general election. A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges that the Secretary is prohibited by law from extending the deadline for the statewide canvass (or any other election-related deadline set by statute). A.R.S. § 16-407.03.
- 46. The Secretary admits that the Cochise County Board of Supervisors certified Cochise County's election results on December 1, 2022, after being ordered to do so by a court—two days after Cochise County's statutory deadline to certify (which, at the time, was November 28, 2022). The Secretary also admits that following Cochise

County's certification, then-Secretary Hobbs conducted the statewide canvass as scheduled on December 5, 2022—consistent with the Secretary's statutory deadline to canvass (which, at the time, was December 5, 2022, and could have been postponed by three days). The Secretary further alleges that the court's order in that situation came as a result of then-Secretary Hobbs filing a mandamus action against the Cochise County Board of Supervisors on November 28, 2022. The Secretary further alleges that the Legislature has subsequently modified the deadlines for counties to certify their election results and for the Secretary to conduct the statewide canvass. See H.B. 2785, 56th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2024). The Secretary further alleges that under current law, county boards of supervisors have a non-discretionary duty to canvass general election results no later than the third Thursday following the general election, A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(1)(b), and the Secretary has a non-discretionary duty to canvass general election results no later than the third Monday following the general election, A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges that under current law, the Secretary is prohibited from modifying or agreeing to modify any election-related deadlines set by statute, including the aforementioned canvass deadlines. A.R.S. § 16-407.03.

47. Defendants admit that a grand jury has indicted two members of the Cochise County Board of Supervisors.

#### **THE 2023 EPM**

48. Admit.

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- 49. Admit that the public comment period for the 2023 EPM was 14 days and admit that many comments were received during that period. Defendants deny any suggestion that the Secretary improperly shortened the public comment period.
- 50. Admit that Speaker Toma and President Peterson submitted a comment on the draft 2023 EPM but deny that the Toma/Peterson comment accurately described the 2023 EPM or its effect. Defendants affirmatively allege that Speaker Toma's and President Peterson's analysis of section III(D) is wrong as a matter of law.
  - 51. Admit.

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- 52. Admit that the Secretary did not revise section III(D) in response to the Toma/Peterson comment, but deny that the Toma/Peterson comment accurately described section III(D) or presented sound legal analysis, and deny that the Secretary was required to revise section III(D).
  - 53. Deny.
- 54. Admit that the Secretary published an updated final EPM on January 11, 2024, and allege that the sole update to the EPM was to the dates in the Election Calendar that accompanies the EPM. Defendants deny any suggestion that the Secretary was required to make any change to section III(D) or that Defendants have sought to enforce the 2023 EPM against any Plaintiff. Defendants affirmatively allege that neither the Secretary nor the Attorney General has ever sought to enforce the 2023 EPM against any Plaintiff.

### THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT OF [SECTION III(D)]

- 55. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) is largely unchanged from the 2019 EPM, which was drafted by then-Secretary Katie Hobbs and approved by Attorney General Mark Brnovich and Governor Doug Ducey. Defendants affirmatively allege that in the letter exchanges between Plaintiffs and the Secretary and Attorney General, Defendants have affirmatively disavowed Plaintiffs' interpretation of section III(D) and any enforcement action by their Offices based on that interpretation.
- 56. Admit that Plaintiff AFPI and others sent a letter to the Secretary and Attorney General on May 21, 2024, and that a copy of the letter is Exhibit B to the complaint.
- 57. Deny the first sentence of paragraph 57. Admit the second sentence of paragraph 57.
  - 58. Deny.
- 59. Admit that the Attorney General promptly disavowed the enforcement of section III(D) that Plaintiffs said they feared. Admit that a copy of the letter is Exhibit D to the complaint.

- 60. Deny the first, second, and fourth sentences of paragraph 60. Admit the third sentence of paragraph of 60. Defendants affirmatively allege that, on information and belief, Plaintiffs neither sent disavowal letters to any county attorney nor named any county attorney in a lawsuit regarding section III(D). Defendants further allege that no part of section III(D) regulates any Plaintiff or any member of the public.
- 61. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) contains guidance for and rules applicable to election officials. Defendants further allege that no part of section III(D) regulates any plaintiff or any member of the public.
- 62. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) contains guidance for and rules applicable to election officials. Defendants further allege that no part of section III(D) regulates any Plaintiff or any member of the public. Defendants further allege that the first sentence of section III(D) merely summarizes a criminal prohibition contained in statute; it does not create a separate criminal prohibition.
- 63. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that the EPM contains guidance and instructions for election officials in addition to rules applicable to election officials. Defendants further allege that it is well established that the criminal penalty in A.R.S. § 16-452 only applies to rules promulgated pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-452. Defendants further allege that section III(D) does not regulate any Plaintiff or any member of the general public.
  - 64. Deny.
- 65. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that the EPM contains guidance and instructions for election officials in addition to rules applicable to election officials. Defendants further allege that it is well established that the criminal penalty in A.R.S. § 16-452 only applies to rules promulgated pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-452. Defendants further allege that section III(D) does not regulate any Plaintiff or any member of the general public. Defendants further allege that the first sentence of section III(D) merely summarizes a criminal prohibition contained in statute; it does not create a separate criminal prohibition. Defendants further allege that the Secretary is not authorized by

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Deny.

in this lawsuit, when interpreted correctly, are lawful.

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#### [CANVASS] PROVISION

- Admit that EPM Ch. 13, § II(A)(2) states in part: "The Board of Supervisors has a non-discretionary duty to canvass the returns as provided by the County Recorder or other officer in charge of elections and has no authority to change vote totals, reject the election results, or delay certifying the results without express statutory authority or a court order." Admit that EPM Ch. 13, § II(B)(2) states in part: "The Secretary of State may postpone the canvass on a day-to-day basis for up to three days if the results from any county are missing. A.R.S. § 16-648(C). All counties must transmit their canvasses to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State must conduct the statewide canvass, no later than 30 days after the election. A.R.S. § 16-648(C). If the official canvass of any county has not been received by this deadline, the Secretary of State must proceed with the state canvass without including the votes of the missing county (i.e., the Secretary of State is not permitted to use an unofficial vote count in lieu of the county's official canvass)."
- 80. The Secretary denies the allegations in paragraph 80 to the extent they are inconsistent with the text of the 2023 EPM. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the Canvass Provision describes the Secretary's non-discretionary duty to conduct a statewide canvass by a date certain. See A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges that the Legislature modified canvassing deadlines after the 2023 EPM took effect. See H.B. 2785, 56th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2024). The Secretary further alleges that under current law, the Secretary has a non-discretionary duty to conduct the statewide canvass by the third Monday following the general election. See A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges that the Secretary has no authority to change the date of the statewide canvass, and is, in fact, prohibited by statute from doing so. A.R.S. § 16-407.03. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the 2023 EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a

mandamus action against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass county election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.

- 81. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that nothing in the EPM mandates the disenfranchisement of any voter. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the 2023 EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 82. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the hypothetical outlined in paragraph 82 is speculative and unripe. The Secretary further alleges that the Secretary does not canvass county offices. The Secretary further alleges that even under the circumstances described in paragraph 82, nothing in the EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the certified results of every county are included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to certify

- election results, or, (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 83. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the hypothetical outlined in paragraph 83 is speculative and unripe. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the EPM or Arizona law requires the Secretary to disenfranchise any voter. The Secretary further alleges that even under the circumstances outlined in paragraph 83, nothing in the EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure the votes of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including asking a court to order the Secretary to certify the election results of any county that has not conducted its official canvass by the statutory deadline (the third Thursday following the general election) and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure the election results for all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 84. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the hypothetical outlined in paragraph 84 is speculative and unripe. The Secretary further alleges that even under the hypothetical circumstances described in paragraph 84, nothing in the EPM requires the Secretary to exclude any votes from the statewide canvass. The Secretary further alleges that in the hypothetical outlined in paragraph 84, nothing in the EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that Maricopa County's votes are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action against the county board of supervisors, or (2) if necessary, asking a court to order the Secretary to certify Maricopa County's election results and include

those certified results in the statewide canvass. The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.

- 85. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the hypothetical outlined in paragraph 85 is speculative and unripe. The Secretary further alleges that even under the hypothetical circumstances outlined in paragraph 85, nothing in the EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure the votes of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) if necessary, asking a court to order the Secretary to certify the election results of any county that has not conducted its official canvass by the statutory deadline (the third Thursday following the general election) and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure the election results for all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 86. The Secretary admits that in 2022, the Cochise County Board of Supervisors for a time refused to canvass Cochise County's election results, but denies the balance of the paragraph. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the Legislature subsequently modified the deadlines for canvassing election results. *See* H.B. 2785, 56th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2024). The Secretary further alleges nothing in the EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results from all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass. The Secretary further alleges that he will, in fact, pursue all available remedies to ensure that the election results from all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action against any county board of supervisors that refuses to perform its non-discretionary duty to certify election results, or, (2) if necessary, asking a court to order the Secretary to certify the election results of any county that has not certified its election results by the statutory deadline (the third

1	Thursday following the general election) and include those certified results in the			
2	statewide canva	statewide canvass.		
3	87. A	Admit that a grand jury has indicted two members of the Cochise County		
4	Board of Super	rvisors. Otherwise, deny.		
5	88. E	Deny.		
6	89. T	The Secretary is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a		
7	belief as to the	allegations in paragraph 89 and therefore denies them.		
8	90. P	Paragraph 90 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
9	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
10		HARMS CAUSED BY THE [CANVASS] PROVISION		
11	91. P	Paragraph 91 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
12	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
13	92. P	Paragraph 92 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
14	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
15	93. P	Paragraph 93 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
16	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
۱7	94. P	Paragraph 94 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
18	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
19	95. P	Paragraph 95 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
20	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
21	96. P	Paragraph 96 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
22	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
23	97. P	Paragraph 97 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response		
24	is required. To	the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.		
25	98. E	Deny.		
26	99. E	Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief		
27	as to the truth of the allegation that certain individuals will cast votes in the November 5,			
28	2024 general e	election. The remainder of paragraph 99 contains argument and legal		

1	conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required,
2	Defendants deny the allegations.
3	100. Paragraph 100 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
4	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
5	allegations.
6	101. Paragraph 101 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
7	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
8	allegations.
9	102. Paragraph 102 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
10	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
11	allegations.
12	103. Deny.
13	104. Deny.
14	105. Deny.
15	106. Paragraph 106 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
16	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
17	allegations.
18	107. Paragraph 107 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
19	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
20	allegations.
21	THE 2023 EPM'S VIOLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
22	The [Canvass] Provision is a Severe and Unconstitutional Burden on Arizonans' Right to Vote
23	108. Paragraph 108 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
24	response is required.
25	109. Paragraph 109 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
26	response is required.

response is required.

110. Paragraph 110 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no

- 111. Paragraph 111 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required.
- 112. Paragraph 112 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 113. Paragraph 113 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 114. Paragraph 114 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 115. Paragraph 115 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 116. Paragraph 116 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.

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- Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that nothing in the 2023 EPM 118. prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that that it is unlawful for a county supervisor to refuse to certify election results by the statutory deadline pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 16-1009 and -1010, which provide that public officers and other persons who knowingly fail or refuse to perform election-related duties are guilty of either a class 3 misdemeanor or a class 6 felony. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the 2023 EPM prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 120. Admit that EPM Ch. 13, § II(A)(2) states in part: "The Board of Supervisors has a non-discretionary duty to canvass the returns as provided by the County Recorder

or other officer in charge of elections and has no authority to change vote totals, reject the election results, or delay certifying the results without express statutory authority or a court order." Deny that this EPM provision renders the Canvass Provision "unnecessary." The Secretary alleges that it is unlawful for a county supervisor to refuse to certify election results by the statutory deadline pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 16-1009 and -1010, which provide that public officers and other persons who knowingly fail or refuse to perform election-related duties are guilty of either a class 3 misdemeanor or a class 6 felony.

- prevents the Secretary from pursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes of every county are certified and included in the statewide canvass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action under state law against any county board of supervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or (2) asking a court to order the Secretary to certify a county's election results and include those certified results in the statewide canvass. *See* Ariz. R. Civ. P. 70(a) (where a judgment requires a party to "perform" a "specific act and the party fails to comply, the court may order the act to be done ... by another person appointed by the court"). The Secretary further alleges that in all events, he will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that the election results of all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
- 122. Paragraph 122 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 123. Paragraph 123 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.
- 124. Paragraph 124 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Secretary denies the allegations.

[Section III(D)] is Unconstitutional

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- 125. Paragraph 125 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required.
- 126. Paragraph 126 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required.
- Paragraph 127 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.
- Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not purport 128. to regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public, and the quoted part of section III(D) does not purport to regulate anyone. Defendants further allege that the first sentence of section III(D) merely summarizes a criminal prohibition contained in statute; it does not create a separate criminal prohibition.
- 129. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public, nor do the rules and guidance contained in section III(D) apply to any activities conducted on any day other than election day.
- 130. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public, nor does it regulate any activity whatsoever that is not at or near a polling place.
- 131. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that the portions of section III(D) quoted in paragraph 131 do not prohibit any activity and are merely examples of activities that may constitute violations of federal and state voter intimidation statutes, under certain circumstances. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the public.
- Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the public.

- 133. Paragraph 133 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.
- 134. Paragraph 134 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.
- 135. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not prohibit any speech, nor does it regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the public. Defendants further allege that the Secretary does not have the authority to modify or amend criminal statutes.
- 136. Defendants admit that states may not criminalize speech "simply because some voters might find it 'offensive" but deny the balance of the allegations in paragraph 136. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public, nor does it criminalize any speech.
- 137. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public or ban anything.
- 138. Paragraph 138 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants affirmatively allege that under a reasoned application of section III(D), it does not regulate Plaintiffs or members of the general public.
- 139. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or members of the general public.
- 140. Paragraph 140 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate Plaintiffs or any member of the general public and does not impose criminal liability on Plaintiffs or any member of the general public.

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141. Paragraph 141 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations.

#### **COUNT I – [CANVASS] PROVISION**

## <u>Violations of First and Fourteenth Amendments Under the Anderson-Burdick</u> <u>Doctrine</u>

### Asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief)

- 142. Defendants incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.
  - 143. Deny.
- 144. Deny. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that the Canvass Provision does ot impose any mandatory duty on the Secretary. The Secretary further alleges that he as a non-discretionary duty to conduct the statewide canvass on the third Monday llowing the general election, A.R.S. § 16-642(A)(2)(b). The Secretary further alleges at he is prohibited by law from changing the date of the statewide canvass. A.R.S. § 16-07.03. The Secretary further alleges that nothing in the EPM prevents him from ursuing all available legal remedies to ensure that the votes from all counties are included the statewide canvass and that in all events he will, in fact, pursue any and all available gal remedies to ensure that the votes from all counties are included in the statewide invass, including (1) pursuing a mandamus action against any county board of pervisors that fails to perform its non-discretionary duty to canvass election results, or ) if necessary, asking a court to order the Secretary to canvass the results of any county at has not submitted its canvass by the third Thursday following the general election, .R.S. § 16-642(A)(1)(b), and to order the Secretary to include those results in the statewide canvass.
  - 145. Deny.
  - 146. Deny.
- 147. The Secretary denies that the EPM would prevent him from pursuing any of the remedies outlined in paragraph 147. The Secretary affirmatively alleges that in all

1	events, the Secretary will pursue any and all available legal remedies to ensure that
2	election results from all counties are certified and included in the statewide canvass.
3	148. Deny.
4	<u>COUNT II – [SECTION III(D)]</u> Violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
5	Asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief)
6	149. Defendants incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Answer as if fully
7	set forth herein.
8	150. Deny.
9	151. Deny.
10	152. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate
11	Plaintiffs or any member of the general public. Defendants further allege they have
12	affirmatively disavowed any enforcement action based on Plaintiffs' incorrect
13	interpretation of section III(D).
14	153. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
15	as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 153 and therefore deny them.
16	154. Deny. Defendants affirmatively allege that section III(D) does not regulate
17	Plaintiffs or any member of the general public.
18	155. Deny.
19	156. Paragraph 156 contains argument and legal conclusions to which no
20	response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the
21	allegations.
22	Defendants deny each and every allegation not expressly admitted herein.
23	DEFENSES
24	Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches. Defendants further
25	assert that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not pleaded

may be granted. Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses.

a case or controversy, and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 1 2 Wherefore, having answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, order 3 that Plaintiffs take nothing, award Defendants their costs and such other and further relief 4 5 as the Court deems just and appropriate, and enter judgment in favor of Defendants and 6 against Plaintiffs on all claims. 7 8 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of October, 2024. 9 KRISTIN K. MAYES 10 ATTORNEY GENERAL 11 By /s/ Nathan T. Arrowsmith 12 Nathan T. Arrowsmith Joshua M. Whitaker 13 Luci D. Davis 14 Shannon Hawley Mataele Office of the Arizona Attorney General 15 2005 N. Central Ave. 16 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 17 Attorneys for Arizona Attorney General Kristin K. Mayes 18 19 By /s/ Karen J. Hartman-Tellez (with permission) 20 Kara Karlson 21 Karen J. Hartman-Tellez **Kyle Cummings** 22 Office of the Arizona Attorney General 2005 N. Central Ave. 23 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 24 Attorneys for Arizona Secretary of State 25 Adrian Fontes 26 27 28